06-10-2025
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote the unanimous Supreme Court opinion rejecting an additional Title VII burden of proof (Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. To establish discrimination, a plaintiff must show that they applied for a position for which they were qualified, and the employer rejected them under “circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” The Sixth Circuit required plaintiffs who were members of a majority group, i.e., white, male, or straight, to also demonstrate “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Four other Circuits have reached similar holdings that majority-group plaintiffs have an extra burden, creating a split among Circuits.
In the case before the Supreme Court, Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, interviewed for a management position. Her employer, the Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, hired a lesbian woman for the position. In addition, the Ohio Dept. demoted Ames and replaced her with a gay man. The District Court and the Sixth Circuit dismissed Ames’ discrimination case because she failed to show the additional “background circumstances” to meet her prima facie burden.
According to the Court, Title VII’s disparate treatment provision “draws no distinction between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.” The language broadly applies to discrimination against “any individual” because of that individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Court stated, "Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.” Moreover, Justice Brown wrote that court precedent explicitly holds that prima facie case requirements can vary depending on context and were not intended to be “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” The “background circumstances” rule violated this stipulation by “uniformly subject[ing] all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case.”